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In this paper, I study analysts’ superiority over the market in processing publicly 
disclosed earnings information by examining a sample of recommendation revisions 
issued subsequent to annual earnings announcements within a short period of thirty 
trading days. The main findings of this study are as follows: First, I provide strong 
evidence that these recommendation revisions convey valuable information to the market 
for clarifying the long term implications of recently released earnings. These revisions 
significantly alter the market's belief about the value implications of announced earnings, 
suggesting that analysts do have superiority over the market in processing pubic 
information. Also, the extent of this superiority is positively related to analysts’ 
performance in picking stocks and forecasting earnings. Recommendation revisions 
issued by analysts with superior performance can make the market revise its assessment 
about the value implications of previous earnings to a much greater extent than those 
issued by analysts with moderate performance. Moreover, the extent of this superiority 
increases with the level of information complexity of earnings signals. Analysts’ 
information is even more valuable to the market for reevaluating previous earnings when 
the earnings information is more difficult to analyze. Lastly, on average, the extent of this 
superiority declines after Regulation Fair Disclosure, but still remains significant, 
suggesting that analysts do not solely rely on inside information from the management to 
interpret public information. Actually, the decline in the extent of superiority is more 
likely due to a great increase in the number of revisions issued by analysts whose 
expertise is not in processing public information. 
Prior studies document that investors also use subsequent earnings announcements 
to adjust their estimate of the value implications of previous earnings. This study finds 
initial evidence that when analysts’ information and subsequent earnings announcements 
provide consistent predictions on how previous earnings is misinterpreted, subsequent 
earnings announcements become less useful to investors for updating their beliefs 
regarding the implications of previously released earnings. This paper also compares the 
extent of analysts’ superiority in processing publicly released earnings information across 
industries and find that analysts exhibit a greater degree of superiority for firms in the 
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Chapter 1:  
Introduction 
Prior studies consistently document that the market reacts to analysts' forecast and 
recommendation revisions. It is implicitly assumed in those studies that the value of 
analysts' information is attributed to their ability to collect and create information that is 
totally new to the market. For example, analysts have access to the management’s inside 
information before it becomes public (Francis et al., 1997; Bowen et al., 2002). However, 
it could be that another crucial aspect of analysts’ expertise, analysts' superior ability to 
process public information, which has been neglected by prior literature, also makes a 
significant contribution to the value of analysts’ information.  
In fact, this aspect of analysts' expertise may have become the dominant factor of 
their ability to make recommendations and forecasts valued by the market after the 
adoption of Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD). This regulation prohibits selective 
disclosure of material information to financial professionals including analysts and 
requires broad, non-exclusionary disclosure of such information.1 Eliminating selective 
disclosure could create more incentives for analysts to research on public information 
release such as earnings announcements. Even before the implementation of Reg FD, 
earnings announcements already drive a large fraction of forecast and recommendation 
revisions, implying that analysts rely on material public information to issue forecasts and 
recommendations (Stickel, 1989; Ivkovic and Jegadeesh, 2004). 
                                                 
1 Recent studies have shown evidence that Reg FD is taking effect (e.g., Sunder, 2002; Zitzewitz, 2002; 
Eleswarapu et al., 2004). 
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This paper studies analysts' superiority in processing public information by 
examining a sample of their recommendation revisions issued within thirty trading days 
after annual earnings announcements. While analysts could acquire private information 
from the management any time during the year, revisions issued following the release of 
material public information are more likely to come from their analysis of announced 
pubic signals. If analysts were more skilled at processing public information, these 
revisions would be useful to the market for reevaluating previously released public 
information. During earnings announcements, the management publicly disclose 
significant information about firms' performance. Price sensitivities to earnings 
announcements are determined by the value implications of currently announced earnings 
for future earnings such as its persistence (Kormendi and Lipe, 1987; Easton and 
Zmijewski, 1989). However, the value implication of earnings is uncertain to both 
analysts and the market, and can only be estimated by them based on their respective 
knowledge.2 If analysts were superior to the market in interpreting public information, 
they would be able to make a more accurate estimation than the market.3 
This paper argues that by revising their recommendations following earnings 
announcements, analysts reveal their belief about the value implications of recently 
released earnings. After observing those recommendation revisions, the market would 
realize that it may have misreacted to prior earnings news and would revise its own belief 
accordingly. Thus, the extent of the market's belief revision represents the extent of 
analysts' superiority over the market in processing public information. Ivkovic and 
                                                 
2 There are many studies investigating investors' learning process under parameter uncertainty (e.g., 
Lewellen and Shanken, 2002; Chen, Francis and Jiang, 2005) 
3 Kim and Verrecchia (1994) suggest that earnings announcements provide information that allows certain 
traders to make judgments about a firm's performance that are superior to the judgments of other traders. 
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Jegadeesh (2004) mention that the concentration of recommendation revisions following 
earnings announcements suggests that analysts identify instances of mispricing during 
this period. Otherwise, there is no reason to expect that recommendation revisions are 
triggered by public earnings announcements. A simple model developed in this paper 
explains how analysts’ recommendation revisions help the market correct security 
mispricing attributed to its prior misassessment about the value implications of 
announced earnings. Upward (downward) recommendation revisions following good 
(bad) earnings news reveal that as compared to analysts, the market has underestimated 
the value implication of previously released earnings. Such revisions would cause the 
market to revise its belief about value implication upward. In contrast, downward 
(upward) recommendation revisions issued subsequent to good (bad) earnings news 
suggest that the market has overestimated the value implication of earnings during the 
announcement. The market would revise its belief about value implication downward. 
Therefore, after earnings announcements, a statistical relation should be found 
between return responses and prior earnings innovations surrounding analysts’ 
recommendation revisions if the market reassesses the value implications of prior 
earnings innovations according to analysts’ information released through those revisions. 
The direction of the relation depends on whether analysts' assessment about value 
implication is higher or lower than the market's prior assessment. The strength of the 
relation, which represents the extent of the market's belief revision, could be used to 
measure the value of analysts' expertise in processing public information. 
The above setting provides a methodology to examine analysts' superiority over the 
market in processing public information. Using this methodology, the following 
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questions have been studied: 1. Do analysts indeed have superiority over the market in 
processing public information? If so, what is the extent of this superiority? 2. Does the 
extent of this superiority differ among analysts? 3. When information complexity 
increases, does this superiority become more (less) significant? 4. Does this superiority 
truly come from analysts’ intellectual skill in processing public information or guidance 
from the management? 
The main findings regarding the above four questions are as follows: First, I find a 
significant statistical relation between returns to recommendation revisions and prior 
earnings innovations in the predicted directions after earnings announcements. Price 
responses to recommendation revisions are positively (negatively) related to prior 
earnings innovations for the group of observations, where analysts' assessment about the 
value implications of announced earnings is higher (lower) than the market's prior 
assessment. This is consistent with the conjecture that recommendation revisions are 
informative about the value implications of previously released earnings, which causes 
the market to revise its prior belief. Results reveal that the extent of the market's belief 
revision can be as high as about 14%, suggesting that analysts can process public 
information better than the market to a great extent.  
Second, analysts possess differing abilities to interpret public information. Analysts 
who have performed better in forecasting earnings and picking stocks also have exhibited 
greater expertise in analyzing the value relevance of public information. Following prior 
studies, I use average excess returns earned by analysts' past recommendation revisions to 
proxy for their stock picking ability and their past forecast accuracy to proxy for their 
forecasting skills. Using both proxies, I find consistent evidence that recommendation 
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revisions issued by skilled analysts can alter the market's assessment about the value 
implications of previous earnings at least 110% greater than those issued by moderately 
skilled analysts.  It seems that this superiority is an integral part of financial analysts’ 
ability as information intermediaries, an important part of whose jobs is to forecast 
earnings and pick profitable stocks.  
Third, investors need to use more of analysts’ information to clarify the 
implications of previously released earnings news when the information complexity 
(uncertainty) of earnings news is high. The extent of analysts’ superiority increases with 
the complexity of earnings signals. When earnings information is difficult to analyze, the 
market may need more guidance from the analysts to help them correctly infer its long-
term implications for firms’ future performance. Following prior studies, I use the 
measure of three-day window abnormal trading volumes surrounding the earnings 
announcement to represent its information complexity. The results show that the extent of 
the market's belief revision caused by analysts’ recommendation revisions goes up by at 
least 43% with the increase of information uncertainty.   
Finally, by examining the impact of Reg FD on analysts’ superiority in processing 
public information, this study reveals some evidence on the sources of this superiority. 
Since the adoption of Reg FD, analysts have lost their access to the management’s inside 
information. However, if they continue to process public information better than the 
market, then it means that intellectually, they are indeed more skillful than the market as 
to analyze the value relevance of public information. The estimated results on the impact 
of Reg FD show that price reactions surrounding recommendation revisions are still 
significantly associated with previous earnings innovations even in the post Reg FD 
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period, although the extent of the association did decline. Therefore, it seems that at least 
analysts do not solely rely on the guidance from the management to help themselves 
interpret publicly disclosed earnings information. Actually, the decline of the extent of 
this superiority is more likely due to the fact that analysts who are not so skilled at 
processing public information started issuing recommendation revisions following 
earnings announcements after Reg FD.  
The methodology adopted in this paper is similar to that used in Freeman and Tse 
(1989), Mendenhall (1991), and Koch and Sun (2004). These studies find that the market 
learns about the value implications of previously announced earnings in light of 
postannouncement information such as current-quarter earnings announcements, analyst 
forecasts, or dividend announcements. 
However, this study differs from theirs in several critical aspects. This paper is the 
first one to apply this methodology to closely investigate analysts' superiority over the 
market in processing public information. Also, I explicitly propose the extent of the 
market's belief revision about the value implications of earnings as a measure of the value 
of analysts' informational advantage as public information processors. In addition, in 
contrast with Mendenhall's study, I use recommendation revisions rather than forecast 
revisions to investigate the role of analysts’ information in signaling the value 
implications of previous earnings. Compared to forecast revisions, analysts’ 
recommendation revisions directly reflect analysts' evaluation on security value relative 
to its price. Therefore, recommendation revisions triggered by earnings announcements 
are more indicative as to whether the security is mispriced because of the market's 
misreaction to previously released earnings information. 
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An interesting by-product of this paper is the finding that analysts’ information can 
substitute for subsequent earnings announcements in terms of helping investors 
reevaluate prior earnings announcements. Freeman and Tse (1989) find that investors use 
subsequent earnings announcements to adjust their estimate of the persistence of previous 
periods’ earnings. I document that when analysts’ information and subsequent earnings 
announcements provide consistent predictions on how the value implications of prior 
earnings news are misestimated, subsequent earnings announcements become less useful 
to investors for clarifying the implications of previous earnings news.  This finding also 
confirms that analysts’ information is valuable to investors for helping correct their 
misreactions to publicly disclosed earnings news. 
In this study, I also compare the role of analysts and the extent of their superiority 
across industries. According to the SIC industry classification code, I divide the whole 
sample into seven industries: Manufacturing, Agriculture, Mining, Wholesale, Retail, 
Service, Construction and Transportation and Public Utility. I find that analysts exhibit a 
greater degree of superiority in processing publicly released earnings information for 
firms in the manufacturing and retail industry. A possible explanation for this result is 
that manufacturing and retail firms usually report financial information that is more 
difficult to analyze than firms in the other industries due to their complex operation 
processes. Therefore, guidance from analysts who follow these two industries is even 
more important to investors.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:  Chapter 2 highlights related prior 
research; Chapter 3 develops the main hypothesis; Chapter 4 describes sample selection 
and design of empirical tests; Chapter 5 discusses the empirical results; Chapter 6 
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examines the information content of subsequent earnings announcements with the 





Chapter 2:  
Literature Review 
          Numerous studies have shown that analysts’ information is valuable to the market 
by examining market’s reactions to revisions of analysts’ forecast or recommendations. 
Early studies such as Lloyd-Davies and Canes (1978) find on average, an event day 
abnormal return of 0.93% (-2.37%) for new favorable (unfavorable) recommendations, 
which appear in the Wall Street Journal. Lys and Sohn (1990) provide evidence that 
individual analysts’ earnings forecasts are informative, even when they are preceded by 
earnings forecast, which is made by other analysts or by corporate accounting disclosure. 
More recent studies (Stickel, 1992; Womack, 1996; Mikhail et al., 2005) also provide 
consistent evidence that forecast and recommendation revisions have information content 
to the market. Asquith, Mikhail and Au (2005) investigate the contents of analyst reports 
in their entirety and find that the other elements of their reports are also significantly and 
positively associated with the market's reaction at the time a report is released. Some 
studies record that the information content of analysts’ forecasts or recommendations is 
related to factors such as analyst reputation, firm size, brokerage profits, and brokerage 
size, etc. (Stickel, 1992; Gleason and Lee, 2003; Frankel et al., 2003). 
Partially, the value of analysts' forecasts and recommendations stems from their 
ability to collect non-public information from the management, which has caught the 
attention of the SEC. The SEC is concerned that the issuers' selective disclosure of 
material non-public information to security analysts has hurt uninformed investors. 
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Despite the controversial evidence as to whether private communications between 
analysts and management make the market better or worse off (Bushman, 1991;4  Das et 
al., 1998; 5 Francis et al., 1997 6 ), Reg FD became effective on October 23, 2000. 
Motivated by Reg FD, Ivkovic and Jegadeesh (2004) evaluate the information 
content of analysts' one-quarter ahead earnings forecast and recommendation revisions at 
various points in time relative to earnings announcement dates. They find that price 
reactions and the sensitivity of price reactions to revisions are weaker for revisions in the 
week after earnings announcements than in the week before earnings announcements and 
conclude that analysts' informational advantage as private information collector is more 
important than as public information processor. Asquith, Mikhail and Au (2005) suggest 
that analysts may play a role in interpreting information previously released by 
examining market reactions to analyst reports which occurred simultaneously with other 
information releases. Park and Pincus (2000) look into a similar issue by examining 
whether analysts’ recommendation revisions have incremental information content 
beyond current earnings surprises during earnings announcements. I find evidence of 
analysts’ superiority in processing public information in the sense that the impact of 
analysts’ information is related to prior earnings surprises. Therefore, my study directly 
shows how analysts’ interpretation of publicly disclosed earnings information is valued 
by the market.  
                                                 
4 Bushman (1991) draws on the conclusion that if firms are given the power to alter the structure of the 
private information market through selective disclosures of private information before any public release, 
traders may be made better off. 
5 Das et. al (1998) provide evidence that analysts issued optimistic forecasts to facilitate their access to 
management's non-public information. 




The evidence on the market's misreaction to earnings announcements is mixed. 
There are several studies trying to explain post-earnings announcement drifts as an initial 
underreaction to earnings and a subsequent delayed price response in the same direction 
(Bernard and Thomas, 1990; Wiggins, 1991; Mendenhall, 1991; Abarbanell and Bernard, 
1992; Shane and Brous, 2001; Liang, 2003;). There are also studies documenting prior 
overreactions to news events (DeBondt and Thaler, 1985, 1987, 1990; Klein, 1990; 
Chopra and Ritter, 1992;). Abarbanell and Bernard also find that value line analysts 
appear to underreact to recent earnings information. However, stock prices appear to 
underreact to an even greater degree. Mendenhall's evidence also indicates that stock 
prices reflect less information than analysts' forecasts. 
The methodology aspect of this paper is in the spirit of Freeman and Tse (1989), 
Mendenhall (1991), and Koch and Sun (2004). Freeman and Tse (1989) report that the 
market learns about the value implications of previously announced earnings from current 
earnings announcements. 7  Koch and Sun (2004) show that investors reassess the 
persistence of recently announced earnings using information released during dividend 
announcements. Their studies also suggest that the market may overreact or underreact to 
earnings news. 
Finally, this study joins a growing literature examining the impact of Reg FD on 
analysts' information environment. Bailey et al. (2003) show that analysts' forecast 
                                                 
7 Mendenhall (1991) finds that investors correct their previous underweights to earnings when analyst 
forecast revisions have the same sign with prior earnings innovations. In contrast to recommendation 
revisions, analysts naturally update their forecasts following earnings announcements. Even though forecast 
revisions have the same sign as prior earnings innovations, the extent of the revision would be larger or 
smaller than the market's prior expectation change on future earnings during earnings announcements, 
which means that the market could underweight or overweight prior earnings news. Therefore, in 




dispersion and other measures of disagreement increases after the adoption of Reg FD. 
Zitzewitz (2002) finds that multi-forecast days that typically follow public 
announcements or events now account for over 70 percent of the new information about 
earnings, up from 35% before Reg FD. Agrawal, Chadha and Chen (2006) document that 
earnings forecasts become less accurate and forecast dispersion across individual analysts 
following a firm increases post-Reg FD.8  My paper augments this literature by directly 
examining whether analysts' informational advantage in processing public information 
has changed in the post-Reg FD periods. 
                                                 
8 Some of the other papers that examine the impact of Reg FD on analysts' information environment are 




Chapter 3:  
Methodology and Hypothesis Development 
3.1 Methodology Development 
         Prior studies suggest that the Earnings Response Coefficient (ERC) is an increasing 
function of current earnings' value implications for future earnings, i.e., persistence and 
reliability, under the assumption of discounted earnings valuation. However, during an 
earnings announcement, the real value implication is unknown or uncertain to the market. 
For example, investors may not be able to discern how much of current earnings 
innovation will persist in the future periods or how reliable the reported earnings number 
is. Therefore, the market has to react to the earnings news based on its assessment about 
its value implication. After observing the market’s reaction to the earnings announcement, 
an analyst revises her recommendation for the firm's stock if she believes that the market 
misprices prior earnings news according to her own assessment about earnings value 
implication. 
Assume, during earnings announcement, the initial price reaction to the 
announcement of Et  (period t's reported earnings) is determined as:  
                                          R ERC E Ft t
t= × −( ),  (1) 
where ERC  is the value multiple attached to the announced earnings by the market which 
is determined by various factors related to the value implication of earnings such as 




t denotes the consensus analyst forecast for Et  before it is announced. After analyzing 
the earnings news released during the announcement, the analyst believes that the price 
should react to the earnings innovation - ttt FE −  with an ERC equal to ERC
A  based on 
her own assessment about the value implication of earnings innovation. Therefore, to the 
analyst, the price reaction to the announced earnings should be equal to:  
                                          R ERC E FA A t t
t= × −( ). (2) 
Any difference between ERC  and ERC A  means that the analyst would think the 
market misprices prior earnings news and would revise her recommendation based on the 
sign of ( R RA − ), which is equal to:  
                                            R R ERC ERC E FA A t t
t− = − × −( ) ( ).  (3) 
When ERC ERCA >  and the earnings innovation is positive (negative), the analyst 
would revise her recommendation upward (downward) because the security is 
underpriced (overpriced). When ERC ERCA <  and the earnings innovation is positive 
(negative), the analyst would revise her recommendation downward (upward) because the 
security is overpriced (underpriced). After observing the recommendation revision, the 
market would know whether it underreacted or overreacted to prior earnings news during 
the announcement and correct its prior misreaction by the amount of ( RR A − ). Therefore, 
after earnings announcement, price response surrounding the analyst’s recommendation 
revision would still be related to prior earnings innovation as equation (3). The sign of the 
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coefficient on ( )E Ft t
t− can be identified by the signs of prior earnings innovations and 
analysts’ recommendation revisions as illustrated in Figure 1.9 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
For Group 1, the analyst revises her recommendation upward (downward) and prior 
earnings innovation is positive (negative). This means that the firm's stock is underpriced 
(overpriced) due to the market's underreaction to prior good (bad) news. For Group 2, the 
analyst revises her recommendation downward (upward) and prior earnings innovation is 
positive (negative). This means that the firm's stock is overpriced (underpriced) due to the 
market's overreaction to prior good (bad) news. 10 
From equation (3), the magnitude of the coefficient on ( )E Ft t
t− is equal to 
ERC ERCA − , which represents the difference between the analyst’s opinion on the 
value implication of the earnings innovation and that of the market. If the market follows 
the analyst’s opinion, then ERC ERCA −  can also be understood as the extent to which 
the market’s belief about the value implication of previous earnings is altered by the 
analyst’s information. Therefore, the magnitude of this coefficient measures the value of 
                                                 
9 I assign a numerical value for each recommendation: 5 strong buy; 4 buy; 3 hold; 2 underperform; 1 sell. 
Therefore, positive revision means that the recommendation is revised upward, while negative revision 
means that the recommendation is revised downward. 
10 I use the recommendation revision rather than the recommendation itself (Buy or Sell) to group the 
observations because of two reasons: first, recommendation revisions reflect the change of analysts' 
opinions on security prices caused by the market's reaction to earnings announcements. Second, analysts 
are reluctant to issue ''sell'' recommendations. In a sample of 17,093 recommendations examined by this 





analysts’ information advantage over the market in processing publicly disclosed 
earnings information. 
3.2 Hypothesis Development 
From the previous discussions, I hypothesize that if analysts can interpret public 
information better than the market, their recommendation revisions issued after earnings 
announcements convey valuable information to the market for reassessing the value 
implication of recently released earnings information. If so, as indicated by equation (3), 
there would exist a statistical relation between returns surrounding analysts’ 
recommendation revisions and prior earnings innovations post earnings announcements. 
The sign of this relation is positive (negative) if the observation falls into group 1 (2) as 
described in Figure 1. The strength of this relation - the absolute magnitude of the 
coefficient on ttt FE − , represents the extent of analysts’ superiority over the market in 
processing publicly released earnings news. Specifically, I predict: 
H1: For Group 1 (2), returns to recommendation revisions issued after earnings 
announcements are positively (negatively) related to prior earnings innovations.  
H1 investigates whether generally analysts are superior to the market in processing 
public information, specifically publicly disclosed earnings information. However, if this 
superiority in processing public information is an integral part of analysts’ abilities as 
information intermediaries, shouldn’t the extent of this superiority also differ among 
analysts themselves? Shouldn’t analysts with superior performance exhibit greater extent 
of this superiority? Otherwise, the expertise of analyzing public information would not be 
regarded as useful skills to analysts.  
 
 17
Prior studies evaluate analysts’ superiority (performance) based on their stock 
picking and earnings forecasting records. Mikhail et al. (2004) find that security analysts 
exhibit persistent differences in their stock picking ability. Analysts whose 
recommendation revisions earned more (less) excess returns in the past continue to 
outperform (underperform) in the future. Stickel (1992) and Mikhail et al. (1999) 
document that analysts' promotions and job terminations are related to their forecasting 
ability gauged by their past forecast accuracy.  
 The next set of tests focuses on examining whether analysts’ ability to process 
public information contributes to their abilities to pick stocks and forecast earnings. If so, 
analysts’ performance would be positively related to the extent of their superiority in 
processing public information. In this study, the extent of this superiority is measured by 
how much the market’s assessment about the value implications of previous earnings can 
be altered by their recommendation revisions. Therefore, I expect that the revisions 
issued by superior analysts would be able to cause a greater assessment revision than 
those issued by moderate analysts, which means that the strength of the association 
between returns to those revisions issued by superior analysts and prior earnings 
innovations should be stronger. Following prior studies, I use high excess returns earned 
by the analyst’s past recommendation revisions to represent superior stock picking ability 
and her accurate forecast record as a proxy for superior forecasting ability. Hypothesis 2 
is as follows: 
H2: The strength of the statistical relation between returns to recommendation 
revisions issued after earnings announcements and prior earnings innovations increases 
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with the average excess returns earned by the analyst's past recommendation revisions 
and the accuracy of her past forecast record. 
If I find that analyst information can help the market solve its uncertainty about the 
value implications of earnings, then consequently, another research question arises: can 
analysts help resolve more uncertainty for the market as the level of information 
uncertainty (complexity) increases? When earnings information is really difficult to 
analyze, would analysts’ information become more or less valuable to investors in terms 
of clarifying the value implications of previous earnings?  
When the level of information uncertainty is higher, it is expected that price 
misreactions to earnings announcements would be more severe due to investors’ less 
accurate estimate of the implications of earnings news. One may think that analysts’ 
guidance would become more important and valuable to investors for reevaluating 
previous earnings news and thus under such situations, analysts would exhibit a greater 
extent of superiority over the market. However, as earnings information becomes more 
difficult to analyze, analysts would also have more difficulties in correctly assessing its 
value implication themselves. If analysts do not have enough expertise to deal with the 
difficulties, it is not certain that their information would be more useful to investors and 
could cause investors to adjust their estimate about the value implications of previous 
earnings as much as when earnings information is less complex.   
As elite information processors, analysts are expected to provide valuable guidance 
to investors for interpreting publicly released information especially when the 
information is difficult to analyze. Therefore, the next hypothesis is developed to study 
whether the extent of analysts’ superiority over the market becomes greater or smaller 
 
 19
when the level of information complexity of earnings announcements increases. Prior 
theoretical studies suggest that trading volume is related to the market's different opinions 
of a signal (Holthausen and Verrecchia, 1990, Kim and Verrecchia, 1991, 1994). High 
abnormal trading volume reflects a greater degree of heterogeneity of investors' opinions 
on the same information signal when they are uncertain about the signal. Since it is not 
clear how information uncertainty affects the extent of analysts' superiority over the 
market, I predict: 
H3: The strength of the statistical relation between returns to recommendation 
revisions driven by earnings announcements and prior earnings innovations is not 
related to the information uncertainty of earnings announcements. 
Until now, an important question that has not been addressed yet is the source of 
analysts’ superiority in processing public information if it does exist. Does this 
superiority indeed stem from analysts’ intellectual skills? Or actually analysts rely on 
inside information from the management to help themselves interpret public information. 
Reg FD provides an ideal environment to investigate whether analysts’ channel to the 
management’s non-public information is the sole or major source of this superiority. 
Since Reg FD was adopted on October 23, 2000, the management have been required to 
disseminate any material information simultaneously to all market participants. Therefore, 
after Reg FD, analysts’ channel to the management’s inside information has been blocked. 
Zitzewitz (2002) reports evidence that Reg FD has had its desired effect of reducing 
selective disclosure of information about firms' future performance to individual analysts. 
If analysts’ access to the management’s inside information is the sole source of their 
superiority, after Reg FD, they would no longer exhibit significant advantage over the 
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market in processing public information. At the same time, analysts would revise their 
recommendations less frequently after Reg FD because they can not get as much the 
management’s private information as before Reg FD.  
However, if analysts are indeed more skillful than investors in processing public 
information, after their access to the management’s inside information has been blocked, 
they would still be able to process public information better than investors. Meanwhile, 
since private communications of material information between the management and 
analysts have been prohibited after Reg FD, analysts whose expertise is in seeking inside 
information from the management would be forced to follow material public information 
release such as earnings announcements to make recommendations. Therefore, in the 
post-Reg FD period, there would be an increase in the number of recommendation 
revisions issued subsequent to earnings announcements by analysts who may lack the 
expertise to process public information. Hence, on average, analysts’ recommendation 
revision would be less informative to the market in the sense that they would not be able 
to cause the market to revise its belief about the value implications of announced earnings 
as much as before Reg FD.  
As discussed above, after Reg FD, it is expected that the extent of analysts’ 
superiority over the market may have declined, but it should remain significant if 
analysts’ access to the management’s inside information is not the sole source of this 
superiority. If not, then analysts’ superiority in processing public information would have 
been gone after Reg FD. H4 is developed to investigate the impact of Reg FD on the 
extent of this superiority.  
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H4: The extent of the statistical relation between returns to recommendation 
revisions driven by earnings announcements and prior earnings innovations has changed 




Chapter 4:  
Sample Selection and Design of Empirical Tests 
4.1 Sample Selection 
The above hypotheses are tested on a sample of recommendation revisions made 
after November 1993 included in the 2004 I/B/E/S database. The annual earnings 
announcement dates and reported values of earnings also come from I/B/E/S. The stock 
returns and price data come from the 2004 Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
files. A sample firm must meet the following data requirements to be included in the tests: 
(1) at least one analyst revises her recommendation following its annual earnings 
announcement within 30 trading days with the revision date recorded in I/B/E/S ; 
(2) annual earnings information with actual reported value and actual reported date 
recorded in I/B/E/S; 
(3) analysts’ forecasts used to calculate earnings innovations for announced earnings; 
(4) daily stock returns and beginning of period price for the 3-day window centered on 
the recommendation revision date in the CRSP daily files. 
I eliminate observations with recommendation revisions equal to zero in order to 
identify instances of misreactions. Observations with earnings innovations equal to zero 
are also excluded because it is not meaningful to study the value implications of earnings 
innovations that are equal to zero. The variables of earnings innovations and three-day 
cumulative abnormal returns are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level in my sample. The 
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above selection criteria yield 17,093 observations of recommendation revisions with 
4,553 firms in the sample for H1. 
 
4.2  Design of Empirical Tests 
H1 predicts that recommendation revisions issued following earnings 
announcements could alter the market's belief about the value implications of previous 
earnings and cause prices to react as equation (3). In order to test this hypothesis, I 
estimate the following regression equation using the above sample:  
 
CAR PER FERROR NPER FERRORt i j t i j t i t i j t i, , , , , , , ,= + × + ×α β β1 2  
                                          + +β ε3 REVt i j t i j, , , , ,  (4) 
 
where CARt i j, ,  is the cumulative 3-day size adjusted abnormal returns surrounding 
analyst j’s recommendation revision for firm i. FERRORt i, is firm i’s earnings innovation 
(forecast error) which is equal to the difference between announced earnings and its 
consensus forecast (mean forecast) deflated by the firm's beginning price of the 3-day 
window centered on the recommendation revision date. PERt i j, , ( NPERt i j, , ) is a dummy 
variable with the value equal to one if the recommendation revision falls into Group 1 (2) 
and zero otherwise. Group 1 (2) consists of all observations where prior earnings 
innovations and analyst recommendations have the same (opposite) sign and the market's 
belief about earnings value implications is revised upward (downward) as in Figure 1. 
While there are two dummy variables for two categories, each dummy variable is 
interacted with FERRORt i, . Therefore, the above equation does not suffer from perfect 
 
 24
collinearity. REVt i j, ,  is the difference between the numerical values of analyst’s j’s 
recommendation issued after the earnings announcement and her prior recommendation 
issued before the earnings announcement. REVt i j, ,  is included in the regression to control 
for the analyst's non-earnings information. The predicted sign for the coefficient on 
REVt i j, ,  is positive. However, since REVt i j, ,  already contains information related to 
analysts' interpretation of prior earnings news, a certain degree of multicollineary will be 
incurred after including REVt i j, , in the regression. Therefore, I will mainly use the 
estimated results of equation (4) without REVt i j, ,  to test the main hypothesis. 11 
β1  ( β2 ) measures the extent of the market's belief revision caused by analysts’ 
information for Group 1 (2). Since for Group 1 (2), the market revises its belief about 
value implication upward (downward), β1 ( β2 ) is predicted to be positive (negative). 
Therefore, the predicted signs of the coefficients in equation (4) should be:  
 
β β β1 2 30 0 0> < >, , .  
 
Since REVt i j, ,  is expected to be highly correlated with CARt i j, , , to check the 
robustness of the estimated results of equation (4), I also test H1 by regressing the 
following equation:  
 
                                                 
11 Following Freeman and Tse (1989) and Mendenhall (1991), I do not include an interaction variable of 
the intercept and dummy variables in equation (4). To check the robustness of the results, I estimated the 
following equation using the same sample: 
CAR PER NPER PER FERROR NPER FERROR REVt i j t i j t i j t i j t i t i j t i t i j t i j, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,= + + × + × + +α α β β β ε1 2 1 2 3





CAR a b PER FERROR b PER FERRORt i j t i j t i t i j t i, , , , , , , ,= + × + ×1 21 2  
               + × + ×b NPER FERROR b NPER FERRORt i j t i t i j t i3 41 2, , , , , ,  
+ +b REVt i j t i j5 , , , ,ε , (5) 
 
where PER t i j1 , , ( PER t i j2 , , ) is equal to one if earnings innovation and recommendation 
revision both have positive (negative) signs as in the upper left (right) diagonal of Figure 
1 and otherwise zero. NPER t i j1 , , ( NPER t i j2 , , ) is equal to one if earnings innovation is 
positive (negative), but recommendation revision is negative (positive) as in the lower left 
(right) diagonal of Figure 1 and otherwise zero. Therefore, the expected signs of b1  and 
b2  are positive and the expected signs of b3  and b4  are negative. 
12  
It is conjectured in H2 that the magnitude of the coefficients on prior earnings 
innovations increases with analysts' stock picking skill and earnings forecasting skill 
measured using the excess returns earned by their past recommendation revisions and the 
accuracy of their past forecast record respectively. In order to test this prediction, I run 
the regression using the following equation:  
 
CAR PER FERROR NPER FERROR SUPERt i j t i j t i t i j t i t j, , , , , , , , ,' ' '= + × + × +α β β β1 2 3   
× × + × ×PER FERROR SUPER NPER FERRORt i j t i t j t i j t i, , , , , , ,'β 4  
                    + + × +β β ξ' ', , , , , , ,5 6REV SUPER REVt i j t j t i j i t j , (6) 
 
                                                 
12 I also estimate equation (4) by grouping the observations as: 
Group 1: (Innovation +, Buy); (Innovation -, Sell) 
Group 2: (Innovation +, Sell); (Innovation -, Buy). 
The implications of the results remain unchanged, but adjusted R2  of equation (4) becomes very small 
because there are only a very small fraction of ''underperform'' or ''sell'' recommendations in the sample as 
discussed in footnote 6. 
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where SUPERt j,  is a dummy variable representing analyst j’s ability of picking stocks or 
forecasting earnings. For the analyst's ability of picking stocks, for each year I calculate 
the average cumulative size-adjusted 3-day (-1,0,1) window returns by taking long (short) 
positions in her upward (downward) recommendation revisions issued in the past year 
with 0 representing the revision date.13  Because of additional data requirements, the 
sample size is reduced to 12,332 observations. Then, for each year, analysts are ranked 
into two groups based on the average excess returns earned by their recommendation 
revisions in the past year. SUPERt j,  takes the value of one if analyst j has a high rank and 
zero otherwise. All the other variables are as defined in equation (4). 
For analyst j’s skill in forecasting earnings, I estimate her past mean absolute 
forecast errors using rolling three-year windows. 14  For this test, the sample size is 
reduced to 16,232 observations because of the lack of past analyst forecast information 
for some firm years. Then for each year, if the analyst’s past mean absolute forecast error 
is lower than the mean of the sample, the dummy variable of SUPERt j,  takes the value of 
one and zero otherwise. 15 
Therefore, for analysts with moderate skills in picking stocks or forecasting 
earnings, the coefficient on FERRORt i,  is equal to β '1 (β '2 ) for observations in Group 1 
(2). For analysts with superior skills, the coefficients on FERRORt i,  are equal to β β' '1 3+  
                                                 
13 Following Mikhail et. al. (2004), reiterated recommendation revisions are eliminated from estimating the 
excess returns earned by the analysts' past recommendation revisions because reiterated revisions have little 
information content as recorded in prior studies. 
14 Gu and Wu (2003) argue that analysts seek to minimize mean absolute 
forecast errors. 
15 The results are robust using continuous variable of excess returns earned by the analyst's past 
recommendation revisions and the accuracy of the analyst's past forecast record. The estimated results 




andβ β' '2 4+  for observations in Group 1 and 2 respectively. Since the absolute magnitude 
of the coefficients on FERRORt i,  is predicted to increase with analysts' performance as 
information processors, β3  should be positive, and β4  should be negative. β6  is 
predicted to be positive because recommendation revisions issued by analysts with 
superior skills are expected to cause larger price reactions. Therefore, the predicted signs 
for all coefficients should be:  
 
β β β β β β' , ' , ' , ' , ' , ' .1 2 3 4 5 60 0 0 0 0 0> < > < > >  
 
H3 is developed to investigate whether analysts’ information can provide more 
guidance to investors for reevaluating recently announced earnings when they are more 
uncertain about its value implications. In the following equation, a dummy variable 
which represents information complexity is interacted with itjit FERRORPER ,,, ×  and 
itjit FERRORNPER ,,, × :  
 
CAR PER FERROR NPER FERRORt i j t i j t i t i j t i, , , , , , , ,' ' ' '= + × + ×α β β1 2  
        + × × +β β' ' ' ', , , , ,3 4AVOL PER FERROR AVOLt i t i j t i t i  
                                      × × +NPER FERROR REVt i j t i t i j, , , , ,' 'β 5  
                                      + × × +β ς' ' ,, , , , ,6 AVOL REVt i t i j t i j  (7) 
 
where AVOLt i,  measures abnormal trading volume around the three-day announcement 
window. Like Landsman and Maydew (2002), the variable AVOLt i,  is estimated as:  
AVOL V Vt i t i n
n








where Vt i n, ,  is the trading volume of firm i during day n at year t deflated by shares 
outstanding of the firm on day n during the 3-day window (-1,0,1) at year t, with day 0 
being the announcement date. For each firm year, I estimate Vt i,  and σ t i, - the mean and 
standard deviation of firm i’s daily trading volume divided by daily shares outstanding of 
the firm during the estimation period (-242, -20). Then for each year, the observations are 
ranked into two groups based on AVOLt i, . Then, the value of AVOLt i,  is replaced by one if 
the observation has a high rank and zero otherwise.16 For earnings announcements of 
high information uncertainty, the coefficients on FERRORt i,  are equal to β β' ' ' '1 3+  and 
β β' ' ' '2 4+  for Group 1 and 2 respectively. Since it is unclear whether the magnitude of 
the coefficients increases or decreases with the level of information uncertainty as 
discussed in Section 4, there are no predicted signs for β ' '3  and β ' '4 . 
For recommendation revisions issued around earnings announcement dates, 
AVOLt i,  would be highly correlated with CARt i j, , . Therefore, I exclude 5,913 
observations of recommendation revisions issued within three trading days from the 
announcement dates. 17  Because additional data are required to estimate information 
uncertainty, the sample of this test is further reduced to 10,919 observations. 
The last set of tests is to study the impact of Reg FD on analysts' superiority as 
public information processors in order to examine the sources of this superiority. I 
investigate whether the extent of analysts' superiority has changed after the adoption of 
Reg FD by estimating the following regression.  
                                                 
16 I also run the test using continuous variable of AVOLt i, . The results are robust. The results estimated 
using dummy variable are presented in this paper in convenience of interpretation. 
17 Equation (7) is also estimated using a sample of observations including recommendation revisions 




                              CAR PER FERROR NPER FERRORt i j t i j t i t i j t i, , , , , , , ,' ' ' ' ' '= + × + ×α β β1 2   
                                                  + × × +β β' ' ' ' ' ', , , , ,3 4POST PER FERROR POSTt i t i j t i t i           
                                                  × × +NPER FERROR REVt i j t i t i j, , , , ,' ' 'β 5  
                                          + × +β ζ6 ' ' ' , , , , ,POST REVt i t i j t i j , (8) 
 
where POSTt i,  is the dummy variable representing post-Reg FD periods. POSTt i,  takes 
the value of one if the earnings announcement date is after the adoption of Reg FD 
(10/23/2000) and zero otherwise.  If '''''' 31 ββ +  and '''''' 42 ββ +  are significantly different 
from zero, it suggests that analysts can still process public information better than the 




Chapter 5:  
Results and Discussion 
5.1  Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 1 shows the breakdown of the sample into Group 1 and 2 as 
described in Figure 1. Group 1 contains 9,102 observations, and in Group 2, there are a 
total number of 7,973 observations. Thus, my sample contains 1,129 more observations 
of market underreaction than overreaction to earnings news.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
Table 1 also reports sample descriptive statistics. Panel B shows that the cumulative 
three-day market adjusted abnormal returns surrounding recommendation revisions range 
from -0.3828 to 0.3234 with mean equal to -0.0048 and median equal to -0.0007. As 
more analysts revise recommendations downward than upward in this sample as shown in 
Panel A, the mean and median of recommendation revisions are both negative. The mean 
of FERRORt i,  is negative, and the median is positive suggesting that there are more firms 
reporting positive earnings innovations even though the magnitude of positive earnings 
innovations is smaller than that of negative earnings innovations. 
The correlation table presented in Panel C shows that the cumulative three-day 
returns surrounding recommendation revisions are significantly positively correlated with 
the revisions, and the extent of the correlation is strong ( ρ  =0.3215). Returns are also 
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significantly positively correlated with prior earnings innovations but in a much smaller 
magnitude ( ρ =0.0309). Therefore, on average, returns to recommendation revisions in 
the post-announcement periods are not strongly associated with prior earnings news. 
Although the magnitude is small, the correlation between recommendation revisions and 
prior earnings innovations is also positive and statistically significant (ρ =0.0641), which 
may be due to the larger number of underreaction observations than overreaction 
observations as reported in Panel A. 
Figure 2 graphs average cumulative abnormal returns for firm years in each of the 
subgroups in Figure 1 during the trading period (0, 39) with 0 representing the date of the 
analyst’s recommendation revision. Consistent with prior literature, Figure 2 indicates an 
event day average abnormal return of about 2% (-2%) to analysts’ recommendation 
revisions, suggesting analysts’ information is valuable to the market.  Another finding 
worth noting is that while investors react to bad news (downward recommendation 
revisions) quickly, it takes time for them to react to good news (upward recommendation 
revisions). For the two subgroups where analysts’ recommendation revisions are revised 
upward, cumulative abnormal returns continues to increase and do not flatten out until 
after about forty trading days. However, for the other two subgroups with downward 
revised recommendation revisions, the average cumulative abnormal returns stop 
decreasing after about eight or nine trading days. It is possible that after analysts revise 
their recommendations, the management may release supportive information to endorse 
upward recommendation revisions, which would cause the market to continue to react 
positively, but they may be reluctant to issue confirming information for downward 
recommendation revisions. Figure 2 also indicates that the market reacts slightly more 
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favorably (negatively) to upward (downward) recommendation revisions following bad 
(good) earnings news than those following good (bad) earnings news.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
 
5.2  Regression Results 
5.2.1 Analysts' superiority in processing public information 
H1 is tested by estimating equation (4) and (5), the results of which are reported in 
Panel A and B of Table 2 respectively. In the third column of Panel A that presents 
results without REVt i j, , in the regression, the coefficient on PER FERRORt i j t i, , ,×  is 
positive as predicted and statistically significant at the 0.01 level (β1 =0.7605,t=15.87). 
The coefficient on NPER FERRORt i j t i, , ,×  is negative as predicted and statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level (β2 =-0.8421, t=-13.76). Therefore, as expected by H1, price 
responses to recommendation revisions are positively (negatively) related to prior 
earnings innovations for observations in Group 1 (2), suggesting that the market learns 
from recommendation revisions that its prior assessment about earnings value implication 
is too low (high) and accordingly revises its assessment upward (downward). If only 
consider the persistence of earnings and assume that earnings follow an IMA(1,1) process 
with a moving average parameter equal to 0.5 and a discount rate equal to 12%, the ERC 
of earnings innovations would be equal to 5.17.18 With an ERC equal to 5.17, results 
                                                 
18 In Collins and Kothari (1989), the sum of the present value of expectation changes on earnings of all the 
future periods is equal to (1-θ  )/r if earnings is assumed to follow an IMA(1,1) process with the moving 
average parameter equal to θ  and r is the discount rate. Therefore, ERC should be equal to 1+ (1-θ )/r. 
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reported in Column 3 reveal that recommendation revisions could alter the market's belief 
about the value implications of previous earnings upward by about 15% (0.7605/5.17) 
and downward to an extent of about 16% (0.8421/5.17) for Group 1 and 2 respectively. 
Therefore, these revisions convey valuable information about the long-term implications 
of previously released earnings news, evidencing that analysts can process public 
information better than the market. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
The adjusted R2 of equation (4) without REVt i j, ,  is equal to 0.026. In Mendenhall 
(1991), the adjusted R2  of his regression equation with the variable of forecast revision is 
only .9%. Although Mendenhall's sample covers a different period from 1982 to 1986, a 
large increase in adjusted R2  is suggestive that recommendation revisions are more 
informative about the value implications of earnings than forecast revisions. 
Column 4 of Panel A reports estimated results of equation (4) with REVt i j, ,  in the 
regression to control for non-earnings information. As predicted, the coefficient on 
REVt i j, ,  is positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level (β3 =0.0191, t=38.85) and 
the adjusted R2  is increased from 0.026 to 0.105, suggesting that recommendation 
revisions can explain a significant portion of price reactions. As recommendation 
revisions already contain information about analysts' interpretation of prior earnings news, 
it is not surprising to find that the magnitude of the coefficients on PER FERRORt i j t i, , ,×  
and NPER FERRORt i j t i, , ,×  decreases after including REVt i j, ,  in the regression 
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( β1 =0.2174; β2 =-0.2072). However, the fact that these two coefficients still have the 
predicted signs and are statistically significant at the 0.01 level provides strong support 
for the predictions of H1. 
Results reported in Panel B are also as anticipated by H1. In both column 3 and 4, 
all the coefficients have the predicted signs and are at least statistically significant at the 
0.05 level. For the two subgroups which belong to Group 1 (2), the coefficients 
on FERRORt i,  are both positive (negative) as expected, suggesting that the market adjusts 
its belief about the value implications of prior earnings upward (downward). Therefore, 
the estimated results of equation (4) are consistent with H1 not because of the grouping 
method, which pools observations with the same signs in one group and observations 
with opposite signs in another group. I find results, which confirm H1 for each subgroup 
of Figure 1 as shown in Panel B. Furthermore, the average magnitude of the coefficients 
on FERRORt i,  is larger in Panel B than that in Panel A for both Column 3 and Column 4. 
The adjusted R2  also improves from 0.026 to 0.034 in Column 3 and from 0.105 to 0.106 
in Column 4. Therefore, the estimated results of equation (5) provide even stronger 
support for H1. 
The finding of a significant relation between returns around recommendation 
revisions and prior earnings innovations in the post-announcement period confirms that 
analysts’ information is useful to the market for reevaluating previously released earnings 
information. The strength of this statistical relation provides a measure of the value of 
analysts' expertise in processing public information. Results presented above reveal that 
analysts’ information can make the market adjust its belief about value implications of 
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previous earnings by about 15%. Therefore, analysts do have superiority in processing 
public information that is valuable to the market. 19 
 
5.2.2 The Relationship between Analysts’ Performance and Their Ability to 
Analyze Public Information 
Equation (6) is estimated to examine whether analysts have different abilities to 
process public information. Especially, do analysts who possess superior skills in picking 
stocks and forecasting earnings also exhibit more expertise in processing public 
information? If not, then this superiority might not be a useful ability to analysts for 
performing as information intermediaries. 
Panel A of Table 3 reports the estimated results of equation (6) on analysts' stock 
picking ability, which supports H2. In Column 3, the coefficient on PER FERRORt i j t i, , ,×  
( NPER FERRORt i j t i, , ,× ) is positive (negative) as predicted and statistically significant at 
the 0.01 level (β '1 = 0.3755; β2 = -0.3976). A positive coefficient on PER FERRORt i j t i, , ,×  
and a negative coefficient on NPER FERRORt i j t i, , ,×  indicate that analysts with moderate 
skills in picking stocks can still process public information better than the market. To the 
market, their recommendation revisions are still informative about the value implications 
of earnings. Consistent with the predictions of H2, the coefficient on 
SUPER PER FERRORt j t i j t i, , , ,× ×  ( SUPER NPER FERRORt j t i j t i, , , ,× × ) is positive 
(negative) and statistically significant at the 0.01 level ( β '3 =0.5400; β '4 =-0.7893), 
                                                 
19 In order to ascertain that it is the recommendation revisions that make the market reassess earnings value 




suggesting that recommendation revisions issued by analysts with superior stock picking 
skills can cause the market to revise its estimate of the value implications of previous 
earnings by a greater amount. The magnitude of β '3  and β '4 measures the extent to which 
the strength of the statistical relation between returns to recommendation revisions and 
prior earnings innovations varies with analysts' stock picking ability. The results reveal 
that the strength of this statistical relation increases by 144% (0.5400/0.3755) and 199% 
(0.7893/0.3976) for Group 1 and 2 respectively if the recommendation revisions are 
issued by analysts whose recommendation revisions have earned high excess returns in 
the past. 
    
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
Column 4 provides similar results with those reported in Column 3. β '3  and β '4  
have the predicted signs even after including REVt i j, ,  in the regression and β '4  is 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The coefficient on SUPER REVt j t i j, , ,×  is 
positive as predicted and statistically significant at the 0.01 level, confirming that 
recommendation revisions issued by skilled analysts can cause bigger price reactions as 
recorded in prior studies. 
The estimated results of equation (6) on analysts' forecasting skill that are reported 
in Panel B also present evidence that supports H2. β '1 ( β '2 ) is positive (negative) as 
predicted and statistically significant at the 0.01 level, implying that analysts with less 
accurate forecast record still have more expertise to process public information than the 
market ( β '1 =0.6183; β '2 =-0.6060). β '3 ( β '4 ) has a positive (negative) sign and is 
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statistically significant at the 0.01 level, revealing that recommendation revisions issued 
by analysts who have an accurate forecast record could provide more useful information 
to the market for evaluating the value implications of previously released earnings 
information (β '3 =0.7256; β '4 =-0.9420). Similarly with the results reported in Panel A, 
comparing the magnitude of β '3  and β '4  with that of β '1  and β '2  reveals that 
recommendation revisions issued by skillful analysts can alter the market's belief about 
the value implications of prior earnings to a greater extent as much as 110%. 
As to results reported in Column 4 of Panel B, the coefficient on 
SUPER REVt j t i j, , ,×  is positive as predicted and statistically significant at 0.05 level, 
confirming that the market regards analysts who can forecast earnings accurately to issue 
more informative recommendations. Although not significant at the conventional level, 
β '3  and β '4 still have the predicted signs. 
In summary, results reported in table 3 are evident that analysts exhibit differences 
in their abilities to process public information. Analysts who have exceptional 
performance in picking stocks and forecasting earnings are also more skilled at 
processing public information than their fellow analysts, although moderately skilled 
analysts still have advantage over the market in processing public information. 
 
5.2.3 Information Complexity 
         This set of tests examines whether analysts’ superiority over the market in 
processing public information is more or less significant when information complexity of 
earnings announcements increases. The estimated results of equation (7) are reported in 
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Table 4. In Column 3, the coefficient on PER FERRORt i j t i, , ,×  ( NPER FERRORt i j t i, , ,× ) 
is positive (negative) as predicted and statistically significant at the 0.01 level, consistent 
with the prediction of H1 that analyst information causes the market to reassess the value 
implications of previous earnings. The coefficient on AVOL PER FERRORt i t i j t i, , , ,× × is 
positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level ( β ' '3 = 0.4964, t = 3.73). The 
coefficient on AVOL NPER FERRORt i t i j t i, , , ,× ×  is negative and statistically significant at 
the 0.05 level (β ' '4 = -0.3692, t = -2.28). Therefore, β ' '3 (β ' '4 ) has the same sign as β ' '1  
(β ' '2 ), suggesting that analysts’ recommendation revisions can cause a greater extent of 
market’s belief revision about the value implications of previous earnings when 
information complexity of earnings announcements increases. The extent of the market's 
belief revisions increases by about 130% (0.4964/0.3807) and 44% (0.3692/0.8309) for 
observations in Group 1 and 2 respectively. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
Column 4 reports similar results as those reported in Column 3. The coefficient on 
AVOL PER FERRORt i t i j t i, , , ,× × is still positive and statistically significant at the 0.1 level. 
It means that when previous earnings is underweighed, analysts’ recommendation 
revisions can cause the market to revise its assessment about the value implications of 
previous earnings upward to a greater extent when the market is more uncertain about the 
value implications during the announcements. Although the coefficient on 
AVOL NPER FERRORt i t i j t i, , , ,× ×  is not statistically significant at the conventional level, 
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it still has the negative sign. The coefficient on REVt i j, ,  is positive as expected and 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The coefficient on AVOL REVt i t i j, , ,×  is also 
positive and statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Overall, the results suggest that as 
the difficulties of analyzing publicly disclosed earnings information increases, analysts’ 
guidance has become more valuable to the market for correctly assessing the value 
implications of announced earnings. 
In conclusion, when information uncertainty of earnings announcements is high, 
analysts play a more important role in helping investors evaluate the long-term 
implications of released earnings. The extent of analysts’ superiority increases 
significantly as the level of information complexity increases. It seems that analysts are 
capable of dealing with information that is difficult to process.  
 
5.2.4 The Impact of Reg FD 
In this set of tests, equation (8) is estimated to investigate whether analysts' 
expertise in processing public information has remained the same or declined after Reg 
FD, the results of which are reported in Table 5. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
 
In Column 3 of Panel A, the coefficient on POST PER FERRORt i t i j t i, , , ,× ×  is 
negative and statistically significant at the 0.05 level ( β ' ' '3 = -0.2213, t = -2.23). The 
coefficient on POST NPER FERRORt i t i j t i, , , ,× ×  is statistically significant at the 0.01 level 
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(β ' ' '4 = 0.5271, t = 4.07). Therefore, after Reg FD, the magnitude of the coefficients on 
PER FERRORt i j t i, , ,× and NPER FERRORt i j t i, , ,×  declines by 24.96% (0.2213/0.8866) 
and 42.89% (0.5271/1.2289) respectively, suggesting that the strength of the relation 
between returns to recommendation revisions and prior earnings innovations has been 
undermined. Therefore, on average, analysts’ recommendation revisions provide less 
guidance to the market for reevaluating previous earnings and are not able to alter the 
market's belief about value implications as much as before. Results reported in Column 4 
are also consistent with Column 3. Negative β ' ' '3  and positive β ' ' '4  indicate that after 
Reg FD, average revisions convey less information about earnings value implications 
than before. 
However, the coefficient on FERRORt i,  is still significantly different from zero 
after Reg FD, suggesting that analysts can still process public information better than the 
market. It is equal to 0.6653 ( β ' ' '1 + β ' ' '3 ) for Group 1 and -0.7018 ( β ' ' '2 + β ' ' '4 ) for 
Group 2 in the post-Reg FD period. Thus, analysts’ information can still cause the market 
to revise its belief about earnings value implication significantly even after their access to 
inside information has been greatly impeded. Therefore, it seems that analysts are truly 
more skillful than the market in processing public information, although the decline in the 
extent of their superiority implies that they may also use the management’s inside 
information to analyze public information. 
However, as discussed in Section 3, another potential factor, which may contribute 
to the decline of the extent of analysts’ superiority, may be that after Reg FD, there is an 
increase in the number of recommendation revisions issued by analysts who lack the 
expertise to process public information. In order to investigate the possibility of this 
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reason, first, I check whether earnings announcements have driven a greater number of 
recommendation revisions after Reg FD and then examine whether analysts who start 
issuing recommendation revisions following earnings announcements after Reg FD are 
less skilled at processing public information. 
Panel B of Table 5 compares the number of recommendation revisions issued in the 
first trading week and the following five trading weeks before and after Reg FD. In the 
first trading week, there is a big increase in the number of recommendation revisions 
from 3,886 to 4,241.  Considering that in the whole sample, there are around seven years 
before Reg FD and less than four years after Reg FD, the increase is 91% per year. For 
the next five trading weeks, the average number of recommendation revisions also 
ascends after Reg FD.20 This upsurge in recommendation revisions, especially in the first 
trading week, indicates that after Reg FD, earnings announcements have driven more 
analysts to issue recommendation revisions. 
The regression results reported in Panel B also provide some support for this 
explanation. In the first trading week, the magnitude of the coefficients on earnings 
innovations decreases significantly. Both β ' ' '3  andβ ' ' '4 are statistically significant at the 
0.01 level with a value equal to -0.5124 and 1.0226. In the second trading period, β ' ' '3  is 
not statistically significant at the conventional level, and the magnitude of β ' ' '3  andβ ' ' '4  
decreases significantly to 0.0681 and 0.3307. Since the growth in the number of 
recommendation revisions is much greater in the first trading period, the evidence 
suggests that when the number of recommendation revisions issued after earnings 
                                                 
20 The number of recommendation revisions is 768 (5376/7) before Reg FD and 898 (3,590/4) after Reg 
FD on average for each year. 
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announcements increases, on average, their informativeness about value implications 
declines. 
It is also shown in Panel B that in the first trading period, overall recommendation 
revisions become less informative after Reg FD. As revisions issued in the first trading 
period are more likely to contain information about analysts' interpretation of earnings 
information, this result also indicates that on average, analysts have less informational 
advantage in processing earnings information after Reg FD. The informativeness of 
recommendation revisions increases in the second trading period, which implies that 
analysts' non-earnings information may have become more valuable to the market after 
Reg FD. 
In order to inspect whether new analysts who start issuing recommendation 
revisions following earnings announcements after Reg FD have less expertise to process 
public information than experienced analysts, I estimate the following equation only 
using observations of which the earnings announcement dates are post Reg FD:  
 
                                CAR PER FERROR NPER FERRORt i j t i j t i t i j t i, , , , , , , ,= + × + ×γ γ γ0 1 2     
                                                    + × × + ×γ γ3 4NEW PER FERROR NEW NPERj t i j t i j t i j, , , , ,  
                                                    × +FERRORt i t i j, , ,ζ , (9) 
                                                                             
where NEWj takes the value of one if the analyst j never issued any recommendation 
revision following earnings announcements within 30 trading days before the adoption of 
Reg FD. Since I predict that new analysts have less expertise to process public 
information, γ 3  is predicted to be negative while γ 4  is predicted to be positive. 
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In the sample, 3,663 recommendation revisions are issued by new analysts while 
4,173 recommendation revisions are issued by experienced analysts. Table 6 reports the 
estimated results of equation (6), which are consistent with my conjecture. γ 3 ( γ 4 ) is 
negative (positive) as predicted and statistically significant at the 0.1 (0.05) level. 
Therefore, recommendation revisions issued by new analysts are less valuable to the 
market for understanding the value implication of earnings information. The extent of the 
market's belief revisions caused by new analysts' recommendations is 28.51% 
(0.1606/0.5633) and 34.95% (0.2934/0.8395) smaller than that caused by 
recommendations from experienced analysts, suggesting that new analysts are less skilled 
at processing public information than experienced analysts. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
 
The above results provide evidence supporting that the decline in the extent of 
analysts' superiority is due to an increase in the number of recommendation revisions 
issued by analysts, who are not so skilled at processing public information. The evidence 
that earnings announcements have driven more recommendation revisions after selective 
disclosure is eliminated also suggests that these revisions are more likely the results of 
analysts' ability to interpret public information. Although on average, these revisions 
interpret less about the value implications of disclosed earnings after Reg FD, the large 
increase in the number of revisions might have helped accelerate the information 
dissemination of earnings announcements. 
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In order to further investigate whether analysts solely rely on inside information 
from the management to interpret public information, I examine the impact of Reg FD on 
upward and downward recommendation revisions separately. Prior studies document that 
the management have incentives to communicate good news to analysts or give an early 
peek to analysts when there is good news than bad news (Chambers and Penman, 1984; 
Brown, 2001; Ivkovic and Jegadeesh, 2002). Upward (downward) recommendation 
revisions reveal that analysts discover good (bad) news about the security. Therefore, 
examining whether Reg FD has a different impact on the informativeness of upward and 
downward revisions would shed some light on this issue. Since before Reg FD, the 
management tended to give analysts early access to good news rather than bad news, 
there would have been a greater reduction of good news than bad news from the 
management to analysts after Reg FD. Thus, if analysts' interpretation of public signals 
substantially benefits from the guidance of the management, then after Reg FD, the 
decline in the information content of analysts' upward revisions in terms of interpreting 
public information would be larger than that conveyed by downward revisions. 
In order to test whether the extent of the market's belief revision caused by upward 
recommendation revisions has declined more than that caused by downward 
recommendation revisions, I split the sample into Group 1 and 2 as in Figure 1 and 
estimate the following equation separately for each subsample:  
 
CAR Upward FERROR Downward FERRORt i j t i j t i t i j t i, , , , , , , ,= + × + ×λ λ λ0 1 2        
                                     + × × + ×λ λ3 4POST Upward FERROR POST Downwardt i t i j t i t i t i j, , , , , , ,  




where Upwardt i j, ,  ( Downwardt i j, , ) takes the value of one if the analyst recommendation is 
revised upward (downward) from her prior and otherwise zero. For Group 1 (2), λ1  and 
λ2   are expected to be positive (negative), and λ3  and λ4  are expected to be negative 
(positive) with λ λ3 4> .  
Results reported in Table 7 are contrary to the predictions. For Group 1, the 
coefficient on POST Upward FERRORt i t i j t i, , , ,× ×  even has the opposite sign as predicted 
and statistically significant at the 0.1 level. Therefore, the magnitude of the coefficient on 
FERRORt i,  increases from 2.6787 (λ1 ) to 3.6507 (λ1 +λ3 ) for upward recommendation 
revisions, suggesting that they have become more useful to investors for reassessing the 
value implications of previous earnings after Reg FD. In contrast, the coefficient on 
POST Downward FERRORt i t i j t i, , , ,× ×  is negative and statistically significant at 0.1 level. 
Therefore, the magnitude of the coefficient on FERRORt i,  decreases from 0.9720 (λ2 ) to 
0.4429 (λ2 +λ4 ) for downward recommendation revisions. Downward revisions convey 
less information about earnings value implication to the market after Reg FD. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
 
As to results estimated on Group 2, the evidence also conflicts with the predictions. 
The coefficients on both POST Upward FERRORt i t i j t i, , , ,× ×  and 
POST Downward FERRORt i t i j t i, , , ,× ×  are positive, indicating that the magnitude of the 
coefficient on FERRORt i,  decreases for both upward and downward recommendation 
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revisions after Reg FD (λ3 =0.5640, λ4 =1.3507). However, the magnitude of λ3  is much 
smaller than that of λ4 . Thus, the decline of the informativeness about earnings value 
implication is smaller for upward than downward recommendation revisions. 
Therefore, both Column 3 and 4 do not report evidence supporting that analysts 
substantially rely on inside information to interpret public information. Otherwise, I 
would find a greater decline in the value of upward recommendations than that of 




Chapter 6:  
Subsequent Earnings Announcements 
Freeman and Tse (1989) show evidence that market reactions surrounding 
subsequent earnings announcements are still associated with prior period’s earnings 
innovations, suggesting that investors use subsequent earnings announcements to adjust 
their assessment of the value implications of previous earnings. This study records that 
analysts’ information plays an important role in helping investors reassess the 
implications of recently announced earnings. Therefore, it is expected that analysts would 
substitute subsequent earnings announcements as to clarify the implications of previous 
earnings for firms’ future performance, if analysts truly possessed a superior ability to 
analyze earnings information. If so, then when analysts’ information provides the same 
prediction as subsequent earnings announcements on whether previous earnings is 
underweighed or overweighed, subsequent earnings announcements should become less 
useful to the market for reinterpreting previous earnings. In order to test this conjecture, I 
estimate the following equation on a sample of first analysts’ recommendation revisions 
issued after earnings announcements. 
 
itititititititit EPSSCONbEPSNSbEPSSbaCAR ,1,,3,1,2,1,10, −−− ∆××+∆×+∆×+=  




where jitCAR ,,  is the cumulative 3-day size-adjusted abnormal returns centered on period 
t’s earnings announcements. itEPS ,1−∆  is the difference between period t-1 and t-2’s 
earnings per share deflated by the beginning price of the 3-day window used to calculate 
CARt i, .21 FERRORt i,  is the difference between reported earnings and its consensus analyst 
forecasts. FERRORt i,  is also deflated using the beginning price of the 3-day window to 
calculate jitCAR ,, . Following Freeman and Tse (1989), the dummy variable itS , takes the 
value of one if forecast errors in period t-1 and period t which are represented by 
itEPS ,1−∆ and itEPS ,∆  respectively, have the same sign and zero if they have opposite 
sign. The dummy variable itCON ,  is equal to one if period t’s earnings innovation 
confirms the analyst’s recommendation revision that previous earnings is underweighed 
(overweighed).  
When do these two sources of postannouncement information provide consistent 
predictions on the value implications of period t-1’s earnings innovations? If itEPS ,1−∆ is 
positive (negative) and the analyst’s recommendation is revised upward (downward), 
then according to Figure 1, the persistence of  the earnings increase (decrease) is greater 
than the market’s prior assessment during the earnings announcement and if itEPS ,∆  is 
also positive (negative), then according to Freeman and Tse (1989),  it is confirmed that 
the earnings increase (decrease) is permanent since itEPS ,∆  and itEPS ,1−∆ have the same 
sign. If itEPS ,1−∆  is positive (negative) and the analyst’s recommendation is revised 
downward (upward), then my study predicts that the persistence of the earnings increase 
                                                 
21 Following Freeman and Tse (1989), the period t-1’s forecast error is calculated using the time-series RW 
model. Therefore, the forecast error is equal to the difference between period t-1’s earnings per share and 
period t-2’s earnings per share. 
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(decrease) is smaller than the market’s prior assessment during the earnings 
announcement and if itEPS ,∆  is negative (positive), then according to Freeman and Tse 
(1989), it is confirmed that the earnings increase (decrease) is transitory because itEPS ,∆  
and itEPS ,1−∆ have the opposite sign.
22 Thus under these four scenarios, the subsequent 
earnings announcements confirm the prediction of the analyst’s information on 
persistence of previous earnings. Since it is expected that subsequent earnings 
announcements become less valuable to the market in terms of helping it reevaluate prior 
earnings news when itCON ,  = 1, 3b  and 4b  should have the opposite sign as 1b  and 2b . 
Therefore 3b  is predicted to be negative and 4b  positive.  
The estimated results of equation (11) are reported in Table 8. Consistent with 
Freeman and Tse (1989), in Column 3, the coefficient on 
itit EPSS ,1, −∆× ( itit EPSNS ,1, −∆× ) is positive (negative) and statistically significant at 
the 0.1 (0.05) level, suggesting that subsequent earnings announcements are useful to the 
market because they clarify the implications of previous earnings. In Column 4, the 
coefficients on ititit EPSSCON ,1,, −∆×× is negative as predicted and statistically significant 
                                                 
22 The other four scenarios that the subsequent earnings announcements contradict the prediction of the 
analyst’s information on persistence of previous earnings are: If itEPS ,1−∆ is positive (negative) and the 
analyst’s recommendation is revised upward (downward), then according to Figure 1, the persistence of  
the earnings increase (decrease) is greater than the market’s prior assessment during the earnings 
announcement and if itEPS ,∆  is also negative (positive), then according to Freeman and Tse (1989),  it 
predicts that the earnings increase (decrease) is transitory since itEPS ,∆  and itEPS ,1−∆ have the opposite 
sign. If itEPS ,1−∆  is positive (negative) and the analyst’s recommendation is revised downward (upward), 
then my study predicts that the persistence of the earnings increase (decrease) is smaller than the market’s 
prior assessment during the earnings announcement and if itEPS ,∆  is positive (negative), then according 
to Freeman and Tse (1989), it is confirmed that the earnings increase (decrease) is permanent because 
itEPS ,∆  and itEPS ,1−∆ have the same sign. 
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at the 0.1 level. Therefore, the coefficient on itit EPSS ,1, −∆×  declines to almost zero 
( 31 bb + = 0.0001) when itCON , =1. Although it is not statistically significant at the 
conventional level, the coefficient on ititit EPSNSCON ,1,, −∆××  still have the predicted 
sign.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE] 
 
The results reported in Table 8 reveal that when analysts’ information already 
correctly indicates that investors misestimate the persistence of previous earnings, 
subsequent earnings announcements become less useful to the market for the purpose of 
reexamining the implications of previous earnings. These results also confirm that 




Chapter 7:  
Industry Analysis 
H3 is developed to study how the extent of analysts’ superiority in processing 
publicly released earnings information changes with the level of information complexity 
by using abnormal trading volume to measure information complexity. However, it is 
also expected that different industries may produce earnings information with a different 
degree of complexity, which may not be captured in the measure of abnormal trading 
volumes. The financial information produced by firms in certain industries may be more 
difficult to interpret than that in others. For example, the operation process of 
manufacturing companies is much more complex than that of service companies. While 
the products of service companies are usually consumed at the same time when they are 
produced, manufacturing firms make products to bring revenues in future periods, which 
incurs a greater amount of accruals in their earnings.  
According to the firms’ SIC code, I divide the whole sample into seven industries: 
Retail trade, Manufacturing, Whole sale trade, Mining, Service, Transportation and 
public utility and Construction and then estimate equation (4) without REVt i j, ,  separately 
for each industry. I exclude two industries (Finance and Public Administration) which 
only have less than 20 observations.  The estimated results are presented in Table 9.   
 




As expected, analysts’ information seems to be more useful to investors for 
reevaluating public information produced by firms in the manufacturing and retail 
industries. The magnitude of the coefficients on PER FERRORt i j t i, , ,×  and 
NPER FERRORt i j t i, , ,× is larger for firms in those two industries than that in the other five 
industries, especially the transportation and public utility and construction industries. 
Therefore, analysts exhibit a different degree of superiority in processing publicly 
released earnings information among firms in different industries, which may be due to 
industry characteristics such as the complexity of business operation. 
However, this difference across industries may have been resulted from other 
potential factors. For example, it is possible that analysts may have more knowledge 
about the business operation and profitability of manufacturing and retail firms rather 
than firms in other industries. Therefore, analysts can do a better job in analyzing their 
financial information. Also, factors such as the quality and quantity of the management’s 
information disclosure may have an influence on how accurately investors can assess 
firms’ performance and thus the extent to which, analysts’ information can help clarify 
the implications of publicly disclosed earnings information. If the quality and quantity of 
the management’s information disclosure varies among industries, then the extent of 
analysts’ superiority may also differ among industries.  
Therefore, a further exploration on the industry analysis, considering all the relevant 
factors, may help us better understand analysts’ behavior and the value of their 






Chapter 8:  
Conclusion 
This paper investigates analysts' expertise over the market in processing public 
information. I find a statistical relation between price reactions to analyst 
recommendation revisions issued after earnings announcements and prior earnings 
innovations. It suggests that analysts convey useful information to the market for 
reassessing the value implication of previously released earnings information through 
these recommendation revisions. The extent of the market's belief revision about the 
value implications of previous earnings is significant, which is evident that analysts' 
expertise in processing pubic information is valuable to the market. 
It is also found that the strength of the statistical relation between market reactions 
to revisions and prior earnings innovations is positively related to analysts’ performance 
in forecasting earnings and picking stocks. Recommendation revisions issued by analysts 
with superior performance records can make the market revise its belief about value 
implications more than those issued by moderately skilled analysts. It seems that analysts' 
superiority in processing public information contributes to their performance as 
information intermediaries. 
Another finding of this paper is that the extent of analysts' superiority increases with 
the level of information complexity. When information complexity of earnings 
announcements is higher, analysts’ recommendation revisions are more valuable to 
investors for reassessing the value implication of previously released earnings signals.  
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By examining the impact of Reg FD on the extent of analysts' superiority, I try to 
investigate the sources of this superiority. The main purpose is to find out whether 
analysts are truly more skillful than the market in processing public information or they 
solely rely on inside information from the management to analyze the value relevance of 
public information. It is evident that although on average, the extent of analysts' 
superiority declines after Reg FD, it still remains significant. Actually, the reason of the 
decline is more likely due to the fact that analysts who are not highly skilled at processing 
public information are forced to issue recommendations based on their diligent research 
of material public information releases such as earnings announcements after Reg FD. 
Therefore, it seems that analysts indeed possess better skills in processing public 
information than the market.  
My results also suggest analysts’ information substitutes for other sources of 
postannouncement information in terms of providing guidance on the value implications 
of previous earnings. In addition, the industry analysis shows that analysts’ information is 
particularly useful for helping investors interpret earnings reported by firms in the 
manufacturing and retail industries. A further investigation on these two issues may bring 
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Figure 2: Daily Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns for each subgroups in Figure 1 
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Sample Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics on a sample of 17,093 (4,553 firms) recommendation revisions 
issued after each year’s annual earnings announcements within 30 trading days from 1993 to 2004. The 
variable jitCAR ,,  is the cumulative 3-day size-adjusted abnormal returns centered on recommendation 
revision. The variable REVt i, is the analyst’s recommendation revision for firm i’s stock following earnings 
announcements. The variable FERRORt i, is the difference between announced earnings and its consensus 
analyst forecasts. FERRORt i,  is deflated using the beginning price of the 3-day window used to calculate 
jitCAR ,, .   
 
Panel A: Distribution of Revisions and Market Reactions 
 
                                                   Earnings Innovation 
 
Recommendation Revisions                                               Positive                    Negative                     
 
                                                                                            Group 1                    Group 2 
Upward                                                                                 4,654                        3,406                        
                                                                                                                               
                                                                                            Group 3                    Group 4 
Downward                                                                            4,567                        4,448                                                                          
 
Panel B: Percentiles of Key Variables for the Sample of Forecast Revision 
 
                              Mean                  Max                  75%                  Median                25%                   Min 
 
jitCAR ,,             -0.0048              0.3234               0.0355               -0.0007               -0.0379               -0.3828 
REVt i,                -0.0890              4                        1                        -1                        -1                        -4 
FERRORt i,        -0.0038               0.0422               0.0015                0.0001               -0.0026               -0.1699 
Panel C: Pearson Correlations of Key Variables for the Sample of Forecast Revision 
 
                                                            CARt i,                                   REVt i,                             FERRORt i,  
CARt i,                                                      1                                 0.3215(<.0001)                  0.0309 (<.0001) 
REVt i,                                                                                                   1                               0.0641 (<.0001) 













Estimated Results of Belief Revision of Value Implication 
 
This table reports the market’s belief revision of earnings value implication caused by recommendation 
revisions driven by earnings announcement. jitCAR ,,  is the cumulative 3-day size-adjusted abnormal returns 
centered on recommendation revision. The variable REVt i,  is the analyst recommendation revision for firm 
i’s stock following earnings announcements within 30 trading days. The variable FERRORt i, is the 
difference between reported earnings and its consensus analyst forecasts within the revision period. 
FERRORt i,  is deflated using the beginning price of the 3-day window used to calculate jitCAR ,, . The 
dummy variable PERt i,  ( NPERt i, ) takes the value of one if the observation falls into group 1 (2) according 
to Figure 1 and zero otherwise. PER t i j1 , , ( PER t i j2 , , ) takes the value of one if the observation falls into 
group 1 (2) according to Figure 1 and zero otherwise. NPER t i j1 , , ( NPER t i j2 , , ) takes the value of one if the 
observation falls into group 3 (4) and zero otherwise. The t-scores are in parentheses. ***,**,* represents 
statistical significance at 0.01,0.05 and 0.1 levels respectively. 
 
CAR PER FERROR NPER FERROR REVt i j t i j t i t i j t i t i j t i j, , , , , , , , , , , ,= + × + × + +α β β β ε1 2 3                                 (4)   
CAR a b PER FERROR b PER FERRORt i j t i j t i t i j t i, , , , , , , ,= + × + ×1 21 2 + × + ×b NPER FERROR b NPER FERRORt i j t i t i j t i3 41 2, , , , , ,  
               + +b REVt i j t i j5 , , , ,ε                                                                                                                           (5) 
 
 
Panel A:  Estimated Results of Equation (4) 
 
Independent Variable             Predicted Sign             Without REVt i,                        With REVt i,  
 
  Intercept                                                                       -0.0038                                 -0.0028                               
                                                                                      (-5.56)***                            (-4.25)*** 
 
PER FERRORt i t i, ,×                    +                                  0.7605                                  0.2174                
                                                                                      (15.87)***                            (4.53)***                           
 
NPER FERRORt i t i, ,×                   -                                -0.8421                                -0.2072                
                                                                                     (-13.76)***                           (-3.40)*** 
 
REVt i,                                            +                                                                              0.0191 
                                                                                                                                    (38.85)*** 
 












Panel B: Estimated Results of Equation (5) 
         
 Independent  Variable       Predicted  Sign                           Without REVt i,                        With REVt i,  
    
 Intercept                                                                                    -0.0042                                 -0.0034 
                                                                                                  (-5.51)***                            (-4.48)*** 
 
itjit FerroPER ,,,1 ×                         +                                            2.6548                                  0.5128 
                                                                                                 (12.07)***                             (2.10)**            
                                                                     
itjit FerroPER ,,,2 ×                         +                                           0.6557                                  0.1474         
                                                                                                 (13.10)***                             (4.42)***     
                                                                                                                          
itjit FerroNPER ,,,1 ×                        -                                          -2.2662                                 -0.2956    
                                                                                               (-10.83)***                             (-2.14)** 
 
itjit FerroNPER ,,,2 ×                       -                                          -0.7026                                 -0.2622              
                                                                                               (-10.78)***                             (-3.71)*** 
 
REVt i,                                            +                                                                                         0.0199 
                                                                                                                                               (38.04)***       
                                                                                                                                                                          














Estimated Results of Stock Picking Ability and Forecasting Ability 
 
This table reports the effect of analysts’ ability to forecast earnings and pick stocks on the market’s belief 
revision of value implication caused by analyst recommendation revision following earnings announcement. 
jitCAR ,,  is the cumulative 3-day size-adjusted abnormal returns centered on the recommendation revision. 
The variable REVt i,  is the analyst recommendation revision for firm i’s stock following earnings 
announcements within 30 trading days. The variable FERRORt i, is the difference between reported 
earnings and its consensus analyst forecasts within the revision period. FERRORt i,  is deflated by the 
beginning price of the 3-day window used to calculate jitCAR ,, . The dummy variable PERt i,  ( NPERt i, ) 
takes the value of one if the observation falls into group 1 (2) and zero otherwise according to Figure 1. The 
dummy variable SUPERt i, takes the value of one if the analyst’s mean absolute forecast error of the past 
three years has a low rank or the analyst’s recommendation revision earned high excess returns in the past 
year. The t-scores are in parentheses. **,**,* represents statistical significance at 0.01,0.05 and 0.1 levels 
respectively. 
 
CAR PER FERROR NPER FERROR SUPER PER FERRORt i j t i j t i t i j t i t j t i j t i, , , , , , , , , , , ,' ' '= + × + × + × ×α β β β1 2 3                                           
                + × × + + × +β β β ξ' ' ', , , , , , , , , , ,4 5 6SUPER NPER FERROR REV SUPER REVt j t i j t i t i j t j t i j i t j                 (6)                                   
Panel A: Stock Picking Ability 
Independent Variable                            Predicted Sign              Without REVt i,                       With REVt i,         
  Intercept                                                                                       -0.0041                                 -0.0029                
                                                                                                      (-4.69)***                            (-3.50)***             
 
PER FERRORt i t i, ,×                                         +                               0.3755                                  0.1556                
                                                                                                        (7.09)***                             (3.02)***             
 
NPER FERRORt i t i, ,×                                       -                               -0.3976                                -0.1190                
                                                                                                       (-5.54)***                           (-1.69)*                 
 
SUPER PER FERRORt i t i t i, , ,× ×                       +                                0.5400                                 0.1135                
                                                                                                         (5.59)***                            (1.28)                   
 
SUPER NPER FERRORt i t i t i, , ,× ×                      -                               -0.7893                               -0.2279                
                                                                                                        (-6.43)***                          (-1.96)**               
 
REVt i,                                                              +                                                                           0.0154                
                                                                                                                                                  (18.18)***  
 
SUPER REVt i t i, ,×                                            +                                                                           0.0145 
                                                                                                                                                   (11.81)** 
 
Adj. R 2                                                                                            0.030                                     0.132 
 
 







Panel B: Earnings Forecasting Ability 
Independent Variable                            Predicted Sign              Without REVt i,                        With REVt i,        
  Intercept                                                                                       -0.0034                                 -0.00251             
                                                                                                      (-4.94)***                            (-3.77)***             
 
PER FERRORt i t i, ,×                                         +                               0.6183                                  0.2432                
                                                                                                      (12.34)***                            (4.82)***             
 
NPER FERRORt i t i, ,×                                       -                              -0.6060                                 -0.2156                
                                                                                                    (-10.14)***                            (-3.63)***             
 
SUPER PER FERRORt i t i t i, , ,× ×                       +                              0.7256                                   0.1358                
                                                                                                     (10.14)***                              (1.11)                   
 
SUPER NPER FERRORt i t i t i, , ,× ×                      -                             -0.9420                                 -0.1512                
                                                                                                     (-6.05)***                             (-0.97)                   
 
REVt i,                                                              +                                                                           0.0177                
                                                                                                                                                  (25.21)***  
 
SUPER REVt i t i, ,×                                            +                                                                           0.0019 
                                                                                                                                                    (1.93)** 
 
Adj. R 2                                                                                             0.031                                    0.107 
 
 























Estimated Results of the Effect of Information Complexity 
 
This table reports the effect of information uncertainty on the market’s belief revision of earnings value 
implication caused by recommendation revisions driven by earnings announcements. jitCAR ,,  is the 
cumulative 3-day size-adjusted abnormal returns centered on the recommendation revision. The variable 
REVt i,  is the analyst recommendation revision for firm i’s stock following earnings announcements within 
30 trading days. The variable FERRORt i, is the difference between reported earnings and its consensus 
analyst forecasts within the revision period. The variable FERRORt i,  is deflated by the beginning price of 
the 3-day window used to calculate jitCAR ,, . The dummy variable PERt i,  ( NPERt i, ) takes the value of one 
if the observation falls into group 1 (2) and zero otherwise according to Figure 1. The variable AVOLt i,  is 
the abnormal trading volumes during the 3-day window centered on the announcement. The t-scores are in 
parentheses. ***,**,* represents statistical significance at 0.01,0.05 and 0.1 levels respectively. 
 
CAR PER FERROR NPER FERROR AVOL PER FERRORt i j t i j t i t i j t i t i t i j t i, , , , , , , , , , , ,' ' ' ' ' '= + × + × + × ×α β β β1 2 3                                          
               + × × + + × × +β β β ς' ' ' ' ' ', , , , , , , , , , ,4 5 6AVOL NPER FERROR REV AVOL REVt i t i j t i t i j t i t i j t i j                (7)                                      
                                                                                                                                                   
 
Independent Variable                     Predicted Sign                  Without REVt i,                         With REVt i,         
 
Intercept                                                                                       -0.00088                                 -0.0002                
                                                                                                    (-1.34)                                     (-0.38)        
 
PER FERRORt i t i, ,×                               +                                      0.3807                                      0.0372               
                                                                                                     (5.38)***                                 (0.52)   
 
NPER FERRORt i t i, ,×                              -                                      -0.8309                                    -0.4048 
                                                                                                    (-8.79)***                               (-4.24)*** 
  
AVOL PER FERRORt i t i t i, , ,× ×               ?                                       0.4964                                     0.2397 
                                                                                                      (3.73)***                                (1.78)*                
 
AVOL NPER FERRORt i t i t i, , ,× ×              ?                                     -0.3692                                    -0.1320 
                                                                                                    (-2.28)***                                (-0.81) 
 
REVt i,                                                     +                                                                                      0.0112 
                                                                                                                                                    (16.50)*** 
 
AVOL REVt i t i, ,×                                     ?                                                                                      0.0020  
                                                                                                                                                      (2.07)**             
 
 Adj. R 2                                                                                          0.021                                       0.080 
 






Estimated Results of the Impact of Reg FD 
 
This table reports the effect of Reg FD on the market’s belief revision of earnings value implication caused 
by analyst recommendation revision driven by earnings announcements. jitCAR ,,  is the cumulative 3-day 
size-adjusted abnormal returns centered on the recommendation revision. The variable REVt i,  is 
recommendation revisions for firm i’s stock following earnings announcements within 30 trading days. The 
variable FERRORt i, is the difference between reported earnings and its consensus analyst forecasts within 
the revision period. The variable FERRORt i,  is deflated by the beginning price of the 3-day window used to 
calculate jitCAR ,, . The dummy variable PERt i,  ( NPERt i, ) takes the value of one if the observation falls into 
group1 (2) according to Figure 1 and otherwise zero. The dummy variable POSTt i,  takes the value of one if 
the revision date is after the effective date of Reg FD (10/23/2000). The t-scores are in parentheses. 
***,**,* represents statistical significance at 0.01,0.05 and 0.1 levels respectively. 
 
CAR PER FERROR NPER FERROR POST PER FERRORt i j t i j t i t i j t i t i t i j t i, , , , , , , , , , , ,' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '= + × + × + × ×α β β β1 2 3                                        
               + × × + + × +β β β ζ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ', , , , , , , , , , ,4 5 6POST NPER FERROR REV POST REVt i t i j t i t i j t i t i j t i j                   (8)                                   
Panel A: Main Effect of Reg FD 
 
Independent Variable                 Predicted Sign                     Without REVt i,                        With REVt i,    
      
Intercept                                                                                     -0.0037                                  -0.0026                  
                                                                                                  (-5.46)**                               (-4.02)***         
 
PER FERRORt i t i, ,×                                +                                    0.8866                                   0.2307                  
                                                                                                 (10.60)***                               (2.73)***   
 
NPER FERRORt i t i, ,×                               -                                   -1.2289                                  -0.4273 
                                                                                                (-11.12)***                             (-3.87)*** 
  
POST PER FERRORt i t i t i, , ,× ×                ?                                  - 0.2213                                  -0.0338 
                                                                                                  (-2.23)**                               (-0.34)                    
 
POST NPER FERRORt i t i t i, , ,× ×              ?                                     0.5271                                   0.2551 
                                                                                                    (4.07)***                              (1.98)** 
 
REVt i,                                                    +                                                                                  0.0169 
                                                                                                                                               (24.98)*** 
 
POST REVt i t i, ,×                                     ?                                                                                  0.0046 
                                                                                                                                                 (4.69)*** 
 
 Adj. R 2                                                                                          0.028                                   0.107 
 
 






Panel B: Results of Different Time Periods 
Num. Observations                                     Pre Reg FD                                  Post Reg FD 
 
(0, 5)                                                              3,886                                              4,241 
 
(6,30)                                                            5,376                                              3,590 
 
                  
 Independent Variable                      Predicted Sign                                         (0, 5)                                                 (6, 30)                                          
 
 Intercept                                                                                             -0.0088            -0.0070                    -0.0007             0.0001                  
                                                                                                           (-7.19)***       (-6.11)**                  (-0.81)              (0.17)                   
 
PER FERRORt i t i, ,×                                   +                                          1.0904             0.1338                      0.5181             0.1742                   
                                                                                                            (7.89)***         (0.99)                       (5.96)***        (1.97)*              
 
NPER FERRORt i t i, ,×                                 -                                         -1.6818            -0.4769                     -0.9147           -0.4966                  
                                                                                                           (-8.46)***       (-2.48)***                 (-8.32)***      (-4.47)***              
 
POST PER FERRORt i t i t i, , ,× ×                    ?                                         -0.5124             0.0643                     -0.0681           -0.0223                   
                                                                                                           (-3.34)***         (0.43)                      (-0.63)             (-0.20)                    
   
POST NPER FERRORt i t i t i, , ,× ×                  ?                                          1.0226              0.5172                     0.3307             0.21945                   
                                                                                                             (4.35)***         (2.28)**                  (2.51)***         (1.65)*                   
                                                                                             
REVt i,                                                       +                                          0.0304                                              0.0107                                            
                                                                                                           (23.83)***                                       (14.07)***                                    
 
POST REVt i t i, ,×                                         ?                                         -0.0017                                              0.0043                                            
                                                                                                            (-1.00)***                                         (3.54)***                                        
                                                                                                                                   




New Analysts v.s. Experienced Analysts 
 
This table reports the belief revision of value implication caused by recommendation issued by new 
analysts versus experienced analysts after Reg FD. jitCAR ,,  is the cumulative 3-day size-adjusted abnormal 
returns centered on the recommendation revision. The variable FERRORt i, is the difference between 
reported earnings and its consensus analyst forecasts within the revision period. The variable FERRORt i,  is 
deflated by the beginning price of the 3-day window used to calculate jitCAR ,, . The dummy variable PERt i,  
( NPERt i, ) takes the value of one if the observation falls into group1 (2) according to Figure 1 and 
otherwise zero. The dummy variable NEWt i, takes the value of one if the analyst only starts to issue 
recommendation following earnings announcement after Reg FD and zero otherwise. The t-scores are in 
parentheses. ***,**,* represents statistical significance at 0.01,0.05 and 0.1 levels respectively. 
 
CAR PER FERROR NPER FERROR NEW PER FERRORt i j t i j t i t i j t i j t i j t i, , , , , , , , , , ,' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '= + × + × + × ×α β β β1 2 3                                                
               + × × × + × + × × +β β β ζ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ', , , , , , , , ,4 5 6NEW NPER FERROR REV NEW REVj t i j t i t i j j t i j t i j  (9)       
                                                          
 
Independent Variable                             Predicted Sign                                       Equation (9) 
       
Intercept                                                                                                                    -0.0076                                 
                                                                                                                                 (-7.32)***                             
 
PER FERRORt i j t i, , ,×                                          +                                                       0.5633                                 
                                                                                                                                   (8.81)***                             
 
NPER FERRORt i j t i, , ,×                                        +                                                     -0.8395                                 
                                                                                                                                 (-8.62)***                             
  
NEW PER FERRORj t i j t i× ×, , ,                             -                                                      -0.1606                                 
                                                                                                                                 ( -1.76)*                                
   
NEW NPER FERRORj t i j t i× ×, , ,                           -                                                        0.2934                          
                                                                                                                                   (2.14)**                               
 















Estimated Results of the Impact of Reg FD on Good News v.s. Bad News 
 
This table reports the effect of Reg FD on the market’s belief revision of earnings value implication caused 
by analyst recommendation revision driven by earnings announcements. jitCAR ,,  is the cumulative 3-day 
size-adjusted abnormal returns centered on the recommendation revision. The variable FERRORt i, is the 
difference between reported earnings and its consensus analyst forecasts within the revision period. The 
variable FERRORt i,  is deflated by the beginning price of the 3-day window used to calculate jitCAR ,, . The 
dummy variable Upwardt i j, , takes the value of one if the analyst’s recommendation is revised upward from 
her prior and otherwise zero. The dummy variable Downwardt i j, , takes the value of one if the analyst’s 
recommendation is revised downward from her prior and otherwise zero. The dummy variable POSTt i,  
takes the value of one if the revision date is after the effective date of Reg FD (10/23/2000). The t-scores 
are in parentheses. ***,**,* represents statistical significance at 0.01,0.05 and 0.1 levels respectively. 
 
CAR Upward FERROR Downward FERROR POST Upward FERRORt i j t i j t i t i j t i t i t i j t i, , , , , , , , , , , ,' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '= + × + × + × ×α β β β1 2 3
 + × × +β ζ' ' ' , , , , , ,4 POST Downward FERRORt i t i j t i t i j  (10) 
 
 
Independent Variable                     Predicted Sign      Group 1              Predicted Sign             Group 2 
       
Intercept                                                                       -0.0045                                                   -0.0084               
                                                                                    (-4.24)***                                              (-7.31)***        
 
Upward FERRORt i j t i, , ,×                        +                      2.6786                         -                         -1.2713               
                                                                                     (7.84)***                                            (-10.49)***   
 
Downward FERRORt i j t i, , ,×                    +                      0.6197                          -                       -2.0715               
                                                                                     (7.56)***                                              (-5.95)***   
  
POST Upward FERRORt i t i t i, , ,× ×             -                     0.9720                         +                         0.5640 
                                                                                    ( 2.07)*                                                   (3.83)***            
   
POST Downward FERRORt i t i t i, , ,× ×         -                   -0.1728                         +                         1.3507  
                                                                                    (-1.89)*                                                   (3.72)*** 
 
Adj. R 2                                                                           0.036                                                      0.031 
 
 












Subsequent Earnings Announcements 
 
This table reports the industry analysis on market’s belief revision of earnings value implication caused by 
recommendation revisions driven by earnings announcement. itCAR ,  is the cumulative 3-day size-adjusted 
abnormal returns centered on the earnings announcements of period t. The variable FERRORt i, is the 
difference between reported earnings and its consensus analyst forecasts. FERRORt i,  is deflated using the 
beginning price of the 3-day window used to calculate jitCAR ,, . The variable itEPS ,1−∆ is the difference 
between period t-1 and period t-2 ‘s reported earnings and deflated by the beginning price of the 3-day 
window used to calculate CARt i,  . The dummy variable itS , takes the value of one if forecast errors in 
period t-1 represented by itEPS ,1−∆  and period t represented by itEPS ,∆  have the same sign and zero if 
they have opposite sign. The dummy variable itCON ,  is equal to one if period t’s earnings innovation 
confirms analysts’ recommendation revision that previous earnings is underweighed or overweighed. The t-
scores are in parentheses. ***,**,* represents statistical significance at 0.01,0.05 and 0.1 levels respectively. 
 
itititititititit EPSSCONbEPSSbEPSSbaCAR ,1,,3,1,2,1,10, )1( −−− ∆××+∆×−+∆×+=  
ititititit FERRORbEPSSCONb ,,5,1,,4 )1( υ++∆×−×+ −                                                                 (11)      
 
 
Independent Variable             Predicted Sign                       Model 1                               Model 2 
  
Intercept                                                                        0.0037                                   0.0037                       
                                                                                             (5.15)***                               (5.12)*** 
 
itit EPSS ,1, −∆×                                 +                                     0.0365                                    0.0788 
                                                                                             (1.45)*                                   (2.14)** 
                
itit EPSNS ,1, −∆×                               -                                    -0.0461                                   -0.0604 
(-1.92)**                                (-1.74)**                     
 
ititit EPSSCON ,1,, −∆××                     -                                                                                   -0.0777                
                                                                                                                                           (-1.57)* 
 
ititit EPSNSCON ,1,, −∆××                +                                                                             0.0278 
                                                                                                                                 (0.58) 
 
itFERROR ,                                    +                                     0.5766                                     0.5856 
                                                                                              (7.57)***                                (7.66)*** 
 
Adj. R 2                                                                                   0.008                                       0.009 
 










This table reports the industry analysis on market’s belief revision of earnings value implication caused by 
recommendation revisions driven by earnings announcement. jitCAR ,,  is the cumulative 3-day size-adjusted 
abnormal returns centered on recommendation revision. The variable FERRORt i, is the difference between 
reported earnings and its consensus analyst forecasts within the revision period. FERRORt i,  is deflated 
using the beginning price of the 3-day window used to calculate jitCAR ,, . The dummy variable PERt i,  
( NPERt i, ) takes the value of one if the observation falls into group 1 (2) according to Figure 1 and zero 
otherwise. The t-scores are in parentheses. ***,**,* represents statistical significance at 0.01,0.05 and 0.1 
levels respectively. 
   
, , 1 , , , 2 , , , , ,t i j t i j t i t i j t i t i jCAR PER FERROR NPER FERRORα β β ε= + × + × +                                        (12)   
                                         
  
                                       Num. of Obs.         Intercept     PER FERRORt i j t i, , ,×     NPER FERRORt i j t i, , ,×      Adj. R
2      
                      
Retail Trade                        1,155                   0.0068                 1.2050                     -1.5256                       0.024 
                                                                       (3.26)***            (4.73)***                (-2.87)*** 
 
Manufacturing                    6,057                  -0.0018                 0.9860                     -1.4358                      0.030         
                                                                     (-1.76)**               (9.11)***              (-10.28)*** 
 
Wholesale trade                     475                  0.0036                  0.6400                     -1.3922                       0.013 
                                                                     (0.93)                    (1.87)**                  (-2.13)**           
 
Mining                                1,010                  0.0050                  0.9762                     -0.4859                       0.021    
                                                                      (3.03)***             (4.34)***                (-2.23)***         
 
Service                                3,966                 -0.0015                  0.7455                     -0.8052                      0.014     
                                                                     (-1.43)*                 (5.84)***                (-4.85)***               
 
Transportation                     1,201                 -0.0049                 0.2778                     -0.3722                      0.011 
& pub. utility                                                (-2.42)***            (2.98)***                (-2.73)***       
 
Construction                           141                  0.0079                 0.2540                     -0.2488                      0.009           
                                                                      (1.04)                   (1.72)**                  (-0.48)               
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